I.      2:30-2:40  General

A.    The problem of knowledge

B.    reforming and promoting learning through experiment and induction

C.    Separation of science and theology

D.   Novum Organum—reply to Aristotles emphasis on deduction

E.    Scientific utopia—New atlantis

1.    Bacon envisioned history as progress

F.    Advancement of Learning: whatÕs in the way: rhetoric, scholasticism, pseudo science

G.   Ignored actual discoveries of Galileo and Harvey

H.   Induction

1.    The emphasis on beginning with observation pervades the entire work. In fact, it is in the idea that natural philosophy must begin with the senses that we find the revolutionary part of Bacon's philosophy, and its consequent philosophical method, eliminative induction, is one of Bacon's most lasting contributions to science and philosophy.

2.    Induction, methodologically opposed to deduction, entails beginning with particular cases observed by the senses and then attempting to discover the general axioms from those observations. In other words, induction presupposes nothing. Deduction, on the other hand, begins with general axioms, or first principles, by which the truth of particular cases is extrapolated. Bacon emphasizes the strength of the gradual process that is inherent in induction:

3.    ÒThere are and can only be two ways of investigating and discovering truth. The one rushes up from the sense and particulars to axioms of the highest generality and, from these principles and their indubitable truth, goes on to infer and discover middle axioms; and this is the way in current use. The other way draws axioms from the sense and particulars by climbing steadily and by degrees so that it reaches the ones of highest generality last of all; and this is the true but still untrodden way.Ó (aph. 19) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Novum_Organum

I.      Forerunner of Royal Society

1.    Bacon was commonly invoked as a guiding spirit of the Royal Society founded under Charles II in 1660.[

J.     He has been reputed as the "Father of Experimental Science".[39]Bacon is also considered to be the philosophical influence behind the dawning of the Industrial age. In his works, Bacon called for a "spring of a progeny of inventions, which shall overcome, to some extent, and subdue our needs and miseries",[40] always proposing that all scientific work should be done for charitable purposes, as matter of alleviating mankind's misery, and that therefore science should be practical and has as purpose the inventing of useful things for the improvement of mankind's estate. This changed the course of science in history, from a merely contemplative state, as it was found in ancient and medieval ages, to a practical, inventive state - that would have eventually led to the inventions that made possible the Industrial Revolutions of the following centuries.[41]

K.   Title page

1.    http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/b/b2/Novum_Organum_1650_crop.jpg/471px-Novum_Organum_1650_crop.jpg 

2.     Bacon's Instauratio Magna which contains his Novum Organum which is a new method to replace that of Aristotle. The image is of a ship passing through the pillars of Hercules, which symbolized for the ancients the limits of man's possible explorations. The image represents the analogy between the great voyages of discovery and the explorations leading to the advancement of learning.

a)     DanteÕs Ulysses condemned to Hell for taking his crew through these

II.    2:40-2:55 Aphorisms

A.    I-III

1.    density and confidence: humans are subject to nature alone and can understand it—Òcf. Of TruthÓ

2.    instruments—for the body and the mind

3.    knowledge and power—knowing causes allows us to produce effects

4.    knowledge and action; theory and practice

5.    there is no heaven or hell or supernatural entity that can be known by science

6.    Nature in Bacon and King Lear—

B.    38-62 Idols—false notions 

1.    smash the idols; iconoclasm;

a)    biblical precedent: —false gods; superstitions; refutation of errors

(1)  So much concerning the several classes of Idols, and their equipage: all of which must be renounced and put away with a fixed and solemn determination, and the understanding thoroughly freed and cleansed; the entrance into the kingdom of man, founded on the sciences, being not much other than the entrance into the kingdom of heaven, whereinto none may enter except as a little child.

b)    Hobbes, Locke, Hume

c)     modern skeptics—Nietzsche, Wittgenstein, Pierce

d)    hermeneutics of suspicion--deconstruction

2.    metaphors: tribe, cave, market-place, theatre

3.    Tribe

a)    Objectivism; Nature and the mind

b)    On the contrary, all perceptions as well of the sense as of the mind are according to the measure of the individual and not according to the measure of the universe. And the human understanding is like a false mirror, which, receiving rays irregularly, distorts and discolours the nature of things by mingling its own nature with it.

(1)  XLV. The human understanding is of its own nature prone to suppose the existence of more order and regularity in the world than it finds. And though there be many things in nature which are singular and unmatched, yet it devises for them parallels and conjugates and relatives which do not exist.
(2)  The human understanding when it has once adopted an opinion (either as being the received opinion or as being agreeable to itself) draws all things else to support and agree with it.
(3)  Indeed in the establishment of any true axiom, the negative instance is the more forcible of the two.
(4)  XLVIII The human understanding is unquiet; it cannot stop or rest, and still presses onward, but in vain. Therefore it is that we cannot conceive of any end or limit to the world; but always as of necessity it occurs to us that there is something beyondÉ for although the most general principles in nature ought to be held merely positive, as they are discovered, and cannot with truth be referred to a cause; nevertheless the human understanding being unable to rest still seeks something prior in the order of nature. And then it is that in struggling towards that which is further off it falls back upon that which is more nigh at hand; namely, on final causes:
(5)  For the sense by itself is a thing infirm and erring; neither can instruments for enlarging or sharpening the senses do much; but all the truer kind of interpretation of nature is effected by instances and experiments fit and apposite;
(6)  LI. The human understanding is of its own nature prone to abstractions and gives a substance and reality to things which are fleeting. But to resolve nature into abstractions is less to our purpose than to dissect her into parts; as did the school of Democritus, which went further into nature than the rest. Matter rather than forms should be the object of our attention, its configurations and changes of configuration, and simple action, and law of action or motion;

4.    Cave

a)    For every one (besides the errors common to human nature in general) has a cave or den of his own, which refracts and discolours the light of nature; owing either to his own proper and peculiar nature; or to his education and conversation with others; or to the reading of books, and the authority of those whom he esteems and admires; or to the differences of impressions, accordingly as they take place in a mind preoccupied and predisposed or in a mind indifferent and settled; or the like.

(1)  Men become attached to certain particular sciences and speculations, either because they fancy themselves the authors and inventors thereof, or because they have bestowed the greatest pains upon them and become most habituated to them
(2)  radical distinction between different minds, in respect of philosophy and the sciences; which is this: that some minds are stronger and apter to mark the differences of things, others to mark their resemblances
(3)  Men become attached to certain particular sciences and speculations, either because they fancy themselves the authors and inventors thereof, or because they have bestowed the greatest pains upon them and become most habituated to them
(4)  And generally let every student of nature take this as a rule, -- that whatever his mind seizes and dwells upon with peculiar satisfaction is to be held in suspicion
(a)  Hermeneutics of suspicion

5.    Marketplace

a)    Idols formed by the intercourse and association of men with each other, which I call Idols of the Market-place, on account of the commerce and consort of men there. For it is by discourse that men associate; and words are imposed according to the apprehension of the vulgar. And therefore the ill and unfit choice of words wonderfully obstructs the understanding.

(1)  But the Idols of the Market-place are the most troublesome of all: idols which have crept into the understanding through the alliances of words and names. For men believe that their reason governs words; but it is also true that words react on the understanding; and this it is that has rendered philosophy and the sciences sophistical and inactive. Now words, being commonly framed and applied according to the capacity of the vulgar, follow those lines of division which are most obvious to the vulgar understanding. And whenever an understanding of greater acuteness or a more diligent observation would alter those lines to suit the true divisions of nature, words stand in the way and resist the change.
(2)  Yet even definitions cannot cure this evil in dealing with natural and material things; since the definitions themselves consist of words, and those words beget others: so that it is necessary to recur to individual instances,
(3)  LX. The idols imposed by words on the understanding are of two kinds. They are either names of things which do not exist (for as there are things left unnamed through lack of observation, so likewise are there names which result from fantastic suppositions and to which nothing in reality corresponds), or they are names of things which exist, but yet confused and ill-defined, and hastily and irregularly derived from realities.

6.    Theatre

a)    Idols of the Theatre; because in my judgment all the received systems are but so many stage-plays, representing worlds of their own creation after an unreal and scenic fashion.

(1)  Theatre metaphor—all the worldÕs a stage—Ralegh